We derive a general optimal income tax formula when individuals respond along both the intensive and extensive margins and when income e¤ects can prevail. Individuals are heterogeneous across two dimensions: their skill and their disutility of participation. Preferences over consumption and work e¤ort can di¤er with respect to the level of skill, with only the Spence-Mirrlees condition being imposed. Employing a new tax perturbation approach that integrates the nonlinearity of the tax function into the behavioral elasticities, we derive a fairly mild condition for optimal marginal tax rates to be nonnegative everywhere. Numerical simulations using U.S. data con…rm the mildness of our conditions. The extensive margin strongly reduces the level of optimal marginal tax rates.
I Introduction
When labor supply is modeled along the intensive (in-work e¤ort) margin only, the theory of optimal income taxation recommends that the marginal tax rates be almost everywhere positive. 1 When individuals respond along both the intensive and extensive (participation) margins, negative participation tax rates 2 may prevail as numerically derived in the seminal contribution by Saez (2002) . As a …rst contribution, we provide analytical results about the sign of optimal marginal tax rates in a model with both the intensive and extensive margins.
To the best of our knowledge, this has not been done in the literature. This paper analytically derives a fairly mild su¢ cient condition under which optimal marginal tax rates are almost everywhere positive.
For this purpose, we consider an economy where individuals are heterogeneously endowed with two unobserved characteristics: their skill level and disutility of participation. Because of the former heterogeneity, employed workers typically choose di¤erent earnings levels, while because of the latter heterogeneity, at any skill level, only some individuals choose to work.
The government then faces a multidimensional screening problem of the "random participation" type (Rochet and Stole (2002) ). It can only condition taxation on endogenous earnings and not on the exogenous characteristics whose heterogeneity in the population lies at the origin of the redistribution problem.
We show that optimal marginal tax rates are nonnegative if the ratio of one minus the social welfare weight to the extensive behavioral response increases along the skill distribution. If the intensive margin is shut down, the optimal equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ equalizes the participation tax to this ratio at each skill level. If this ratio is increasing in the skill level, so does the participation tax. If now the intensive margin is taken into account, positive marginal tax rates distort intensive responses downwards. Consequently, the optimal equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ takes this additional distortion into account and opts for lower but still positive marginal tax rates (except at the two extremes of the skill distribution). While our su¢ cient condition is expressed in terms of endogenous variables, we discuss its relevance in practice and provide examples of speci…cations on primitives where this condition holds. For instance, when the government has a Maximin objective, the restrictions imposed by our su¢ cient condition are fairly weak.
In order to derive the condition that ensures positive marginal tax rates, this paper introduces a new method to sign the distortions along the intensive margin in any screening model with random participation. This new technique, that can largely be used in other contexts of 1 See, e.g., Mirrlees (1971) , Sadka (1976) , Seade (1982) , Werning (2000) or Hellwig (2007) . See however the counterexamples of Choné and Laroque (2009b) . 2 The participation tax rate equals the tax level plus the bene…t for the nonemployed.
monopoly screening with random participation, is the second contribution of our paper.
Since Mirrlees (1971) , the optimal tax problem is usually solved by searching for the best incentive-compatible allocation using optimal control. While this method has proved successful, it lacks economic intuition. A natural alternative consists in computing the e¤ects of a perturbation in the optimal tax schedule. However, this "tax perturbation" approach is not often adopted, one reason being the following "circular process": Due to the nonlinearity of the tax schedule, when labor supply responds to a tax perturbation, the induced change in gross income a¤ects in turn the marginal tax rate, thereby generating a further labor supply response. Our third contribution is to directly derive the optimal tax formula thanks to a new tax perturbation approach by de…ning behavioral elasticities in a way that integrates this circular process. We express optimal marginal rates as a function of the social welfare weights, the skill distribution and the behavioral elasticities. Our decomposition generalizes previous results by allowing for income e¤ects and extensive margin responses. We verify that the Mirrleesian approach leads to the same formula.
In the presence of income e¤ects, the literature has established that the optimal marginal tax rates are ceteris paribus increasing in the uncompensated elasticity of the labor supply, which is puzzling (see, for instance, Equation (25) in Saez (2001) ). We show that marginal tax rates are actually increasing in the elasticity of gross income with respect to the skill level. The latter elasticity equals one plus the uncompensated elasticity of the labor supply only when preferences over consumption and in-work e¤ort are homogeneous and when gross income is the product of the intensive in-work e¤ort times the skill level. Our fourth contribution is to clarify this point by relaxing these usual assumptions, keeping only the Spence-Mirrlees restriction.
Finally, using U.S. data, we check whether our su¢ cient condition for nonnegative marginal tax rates is empirically reasonable and we illustrate the quantitative implications of our optimal tax formula. We …nd that marginal tax rates are always positive and that our su¢ cient condition is largely satis…ed. Moreover, the standard U-shape pro…le obtained in the Mirrlees model is still valid when both margins are considered. However, introducing the extensive margin has a quantitatively important impact. In our benchmark simulation, the mean of the marginal tax rates between 0 and $100; 000 per year is reduced by 11:3 percentage points under the Benthamite criterion and by 36:5 percentage points under Maximin when the extensive margin is introduced.
We also …nd that, for the least skilled workers, participation taxes are typically negative under the Benthamite criterion, while they are always positive under Maximin. 3 Under Benthamite preferences, with a strictly positive lower bound for the earnings distribution, 4 our simulations 3 The literature on optimal taxation in the pure extensive model has typically found the latter (e.g. Choné and Laroque (2005) ). The optimality of a negative participation tax at the bottom of the earnings distribution is interpreted as a case for an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) rather than an Negative Income Tax (NIT) (see Saez (2002) ). 4 We assume a strictly positive minimum for the skill distribution.
show a negative participation tax rate at this minimum (as for the EITC) and positive marginal tax rates (as for the NIT). In such case, the optimal tax schedule is a third way between NIT and EITC with negative participation taxes at the low end of the skill distribution and positive marginal tax rates everywhere.
For many years following Mirrlees'(1971) seminal work, the various theoretical developments focused on useful technical re…nements but provided little economic intuitions. The …rst important advance was made when Atkinson (1990) , Piketty (1997) and Diamond (1998) reexpressed optimality conditions derived from the Mirrlees model in terms of behavioral elasticities in the absence of income e¤ects. Saez (2001) provided a second important advance by deriving an optimal tax formula using the tax perturbation approach. 5 He took into account the abovementioned "circular process"by expressing the optimal tax formula in terms of the unappealing notion of a"virtual" 6 earnings distribution and veri…ed the consistency of his solution with that in Mirrlees (1971) . Further, Saez (2001) allowed for income e¤ects. In this study, we avoid the use of virtual densities because of our rede…nition of the behavioral elasticities.
The above-mentioned studies neglected labor supply responses along the extensive margin, while the empirical labor supply literature emphasizes that labor supply responses along the extensive margin are much more important (see, e.g., Heckman (1993) ). Saez (2002) derived an optimal tax formula in an economy with both intensive and extensive margins. Saez (2002) focused on the EITC/NIT debate about whether the working poor should receive greater transfers than nonemployed individuals (i.e. about the sign of the participation tax at the bottom), while we discuss the conditions under which marginal tax rates should be nonnegative. Moreover, our formula allows for income e¤ects. 7 He developed a model where agents choose from a …nite set of occupations, each associated with an exogenous level of earnings. We treat the intensive margin in a continuous way, which we think is more appropriate for the study of marginal tax rates.
Kleven and Kreiner (2006) consider a model with both margins. Their model as ours exhibits a bi-dimensional heterogeneity. However, we allow preferences between consumption and work e¤ort to di¤er across skill levels. Moreover, they focus on the computation of the marginal 5 Christiansen (1981) …rst introduced the tax perturbation approach. However, he did not derive any implications for the optimal income tax, his focus being instead on the optimal provision of public goods and the structure of commodity taxation. Revecz (1989) also proposed a method to derive an optimal income tax formula in terms of elasticities but did not consider the above-mentioned circular process. Hence, his solution was inconsistent with Mirrlees (1971) (see Revecz (2003) and Saez (2003) ). Using a tax perturbation method, Piketty (1997) derived the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule under Maximin. However, he too neglected to take into account the circular process, though this had no consequence as he assumed away the income e¤ects. Roberts (2000) derived an optimal tax formula under Benthamite preferences. 6 Saez (2001, p.215) de…nes the virtual density at earnings level z as "the density of incomes that would take place at z if the tax schedule T (:) were replaced by the linear tax schedule tangent to T (:) at level z". 7 The formal model in the appendix in Saez (2002) allows for the possibility of income e¤ects. Moreover, the appendix in Saez (2000) (the NBER version of Saez (2002) ) extends his optimal tax formula with both extensive and intensive responses to the case of a continuum of earnings but still without income e¤ects. cost of public funds, while we are interested in the design of the optimal income tax schedule. Their speci…cation of the search technology implies that any individual with a skill level above (below) an endogenous threshold searches at the maximum intensity (does not search).
Section II presents the model. Section III derives the optimal tax formula in terms of behavioral elasticities using the tax perturbation method. This section also compares the obtained tax formula with the existing literature. Section IV provides a su¢ cient condition to ensure nonnegative optimal marginal tax rates and gives examples where this condition is satis…ed.
Section V presents the simulations for the U.S. In the appendix, we develop the formal model.
In particular, we solve for the optimal allocations using the typical optimal control approach.
We then verify that this solution is consistent with that derived in the main body of the text.
II The model

II.1 Individuals
Each individual derives utility from consumption C and disutility from labor supply or e¤ort L. More e¤ort implies higher earnings Y , the relationship between the two also depends on the individual's skill endowment w. The literature typically assumes that Y = w L. To avoid this unnecessary restriction on the technology, we express individuals' preferences in terms of the observables (C and Y ) and the individuals'exogenous characteristics (particularly w). This also enables us to consider cases where the preferences over consumption C and e¤ort L are skill dependent. The skill endowments are exogenous, heterogeneous and unobserved by government.
Hence, consumption C is related to earnings Y through the tax function C = Y T (Y ).
The empirical literature has emphasized that a signi…cant part of the labor supply responses to tax reforms are concentrated along the extensive margin. We integrate this feature by considering a speci…c disutility of participation, which makes a di¤erence in the level of utility only between workers (for whom Y > 0) and the nonemployed (for whom Y = 0). This disutility may arise from commuting, job-search e¤ort, or the reduced amount of time available for home production. However, for some people, employment has a value per se, as at least some enjoy working (see, e.g., Polachek and Siebert (1993, p. 101)). Some individuals would even feel stigmatized if they had no job. Let denote an individual's disutility of participation net of this intrinsic job value. We assume that people are endowed with di¤erent positive or negative (net) disutility of participation . As for the skill endowment, is exogenous and unobserved by the government. Because of this additional heterogeneity, individuals with the same skill level may take di¤erent participation decisions. This is consistent with the observation that in all OECD countries, skill-speci…c employment rates always lie inside (0; 1).
For tractability, we require that the intensive labor supply decisions Y of individuals that have chosen to work depend only on their skill and not on their net disutility of participation.
To obtain this simpli…cation, we need to impose some separability in individuals' preferences.
We specify the utility function of an individual of type (w; ) as:
where I Y >0 is an indicator variable equal to one if the individual works and zero otherwise.
The gross utility function U (:; :; :) is twice-continuously di¤erentiable and concave with respect to (C; Y ). Individuals derive utility from consumption C and disutility from labor supply, so
This utility function allows preferences over C and Y to vary with w. Finally, we impose the strict-single crossing (Spence-Mirrlees) condition. We assume that, starting from any positive level of consumption and earnings, more skilled workers need to be compensated 
The distribution of skills is described by the density f (:), which is continuous and positive over the support [w 0 ; w 1 ], with 0 < w 0 < w 1 +1. It is worth noting that the lowest skill is positive. The size of the total population is normalized to 1 so
The distribution of conditional on the skill level w is described by the conditional density k (:; w) and the cumulated density function K ( ; w) def R 1 k (x; w) dx. The density k (:; :) is continuously di¤erentiable. It is worth noting that we do not assume independence between w and . The support of the distribution is ( 1; max ], with max +1. The assumption about the lower bound is made for tractability as it ensures a positive mass of employed individuals at each skill level.
Each agent solves the following maximization problem:
where the choice of Y can be decomposed into a participation decision (i.e., Y = 0 or Y > 0) and an intensive choice (i.e., the value of Y when Y > 0). For a worker of type (w; ), selecting a positive earnings level Y to maximize U (C; Y; w) subject to C = Y T (Y ) amounts to solving:
In particular, two workers with the same skill level but with a di¤erent disutility of participation face the same intensive choice program, thereby taking the same decisions along the intensive margin. 8 Let Y w be the intensive choice of a worker of skill w, and let C w be the corresponding consumption level, so C w = Y w T (Y w ). The gross utility of workers of skill w therefore equals U w = U (C w ; Y w ; w). We ignore the non-negativity constraint on Y w when solving the intensive choice program. We verify in our simulations that the minimum of the earnings distribution is always positive (given that we assume w 0 > 0). Therefore, the possibility of bunching due to the nonnegativity constraint can be neglected.
We now turn to the participation decisions. Let b = T (0) denote the consumption level for the nonemployed. We refer to b as the welfare bene…t. If an individual of type (w; ) chooses to work, she obtains utility U w . If she chooses not to participate, she obtains U (b; 0; w). An individual of type (w; ) then chooses to work if U w U (b; 0; w). Therefore, the mass of workers of skill w is given by h (w) de…ned as:
with some abuse of notation as h (w) does not make explicit the dependence of h (:) with respect to b and U w . The function h (w) is twice-continuously di¤erentiable, increasing in U w and decreasing in b, with respective derivatives h 0 U (w) and h 0 b (w) given by
The number of workers of skill less than w is H (w) = R w w 0 h (n) dn. There are then H (w 1 ) employed individuals and 1 H (w 1 ) nonemployed individuals. 8 The key assumption for this result is that preferences over consumption and earnings for employed agents vary only with skill and do not depend on the net disutility of participation . Such a property is obtained under weakly separable preferences of the form:
where W is discontinuous at Y = 0, V (:; :; :) is an aggregator increasing in its …rst argument, function U (:; :; :) veri…es U , and …nally, the assumption that for given levels of C, Y , w and b, the function 7 ! V (U (C; Y; w) ; w; ) U 0 (b; w; ) is decreasing and admits a positive limit whenever tends to 1. All results derived in this paper can be obtained under this more general speci…cation, the additional di¢ culty being only notational.
II.2 Behavioral elasticities
We de…ne the behavioral elasticities from the intensive choice program (3) and the extensive margin decision (4) . When the tax function is di¤erentiable, (3) implies:
where the derivatives of U (:) are evaluated at (C w ; Y w ; w). When the tax function is twice di¤erentiable, the second-order condition is:
As function U (:; :; w) is concave, the second-order condition (6) is satis…ed when the tax function is linear or convex or is not "too concave".Whenever (6) strictly holds, which we henceforth assume throughout the remainder of this section, the …rst-order condition (5) implicitly de…nes 9 earnings Y w as a function of the skill level and the tax function. The elasticity w of earnings with respect to the skill level equals: 10
Letĥ ( . From Equation (7), h (w) andĥ (Y w ) are thus related by:
If the left-hand side of (6) Conversely, bunching of types occurs when w = 0 (i.e. T 00 (Y ) tends to plus in…nity). This corresponds to a kink in the tax function. From here on, we assume that T (:) is di¤erentiable and hence exclude bunching. However, this assumption is relaxed in the appendix, where we 9 In addition, one has to assume that among the possible multiple local maxima of Y 7 ! U (Y T (Y ) ; Y; w), a single maximum corresponds to the global maximum. If program Y 7 ! U (Y T (Y ) ; Y; w ) admits two global maxima for a skill level w , workers of a skill level w slightly above (below) w would strictly prefer the higher (lower) maximum because of the strict single-crossing condition (2) . Hence, function w 7 ! Yw exhibits a discontinuity at skill w . Moreover, once again through the strict single-crossing condition, function w 7 ! Yw is nondecreasing. Therefore, it is discontinuous on a set of skill levels that is at worst countable (and at best empty). Because the skill distribution is assumed continuous without any mass point, the latter set is of zero measure. Insert Figure 1 about here.
The behavioral response to this reform by a worker of skill w is captured by the compensated elasticity of earnings with respect to 1 T 0 (Y ): 11
When the marginal tax rate is decreased by , a unit rise Y w in earnings generates a higher
Therefore, workers substitute earnings for leisure. Finally, this reform only has a second-order e¤ect on U w and thereby on the participation decisions. 12 The next elementary tax reform captures the income e¤ect around the actual tax schedule.
The level of tax decreases by a small lump sum over a range in earnings [Y w ; Y w + ]. This reform is illustrated by the right-hand side panel in Figure 1 . Along the intensive margin, the behavioral response for a worker of skill w to this reform is captured by the income e¤ect:
This term can be either positive or negative. However, when leisure is a normal good, the numerator is positive; hence, the income e¤ect (10) is negative.
The " -reform"illustrated by the right-hand side panel in Figure 1 also induces some individuals of skill w to enter the labor market. We capture this extensive response for individuals of skill w with:
The elasticity "w is compensated in the sense that the tax level is unchanged at earnings level Yw. 1 2 Decreasing T 0 (:) by implies a rise Yw of earnings, which itself increases Cw by
Therefore the impact on Uw is given by
2 where the second equality follows (5) and (9) through Yw = ("wYw= (1 T 0 (Yw))) .
which stands for the percentage of variation in the mass of workers with skill level w. Finally, we measure the elasticity of participation when, combined with a uniform decrease in the tax level by , the welfare bene…t b rises by (i.e., when T (Y ) + b is kept constant). This reform captures income e¤ects along the extensive margin. The (endogenous) semi-elasticity of the number of employed individuals of skill w with respect to such a reform equals:
When the utility function U (:; :; :) is additively separable and concave in consumption and if
Income e¤ects along the extensive margin are then negative, which corresponds to the "normal" case.
The behavioral responses given in (7), (9), (10), (11) and (12) are endogenous in that they depend on the skill level w, the earnings level Y and the tax function T (:). In particular, the various responses along the intensive margin given in (7), (9) and (10) along the actual (or later optimal) tax schedule, which we allow to be nonlinear. 13 Therefore, our behavioral response parameters (7), (9) and (10) take into account the circular process and exhibit the term T 00 (:) in their denominators.
II.3 The government
The government's budget constraint takes the form:
where E is an exogenous amount of public expenditures. For each additional worker of skill w, the government collects taxes T (Y w ) and saves welfare bene…t b.
Turning now to the government's objective, we adopt a welfarist criterion that sums over all types of individuals a transformation G (v; w; ) of individuals'utility v, with G (:; :; :) twicecontinuously di¤erentiable and G 0 v > 0. Given the labor supply decisions, the government's objective is:
The social transformation function G (:; :; :) depends not only on the utility levels v of individuals, but also on their exogenous type (w; ). Our social welfare function generalizes the BergsonSamuelson social objective, which does not depend on the individuals' type. With the latter criterion, the preferences for redistribution would be induced by the concavity of G (:); that is, by G 00 vv < 0. Our speci…cation also encompasses the case where function G (:; :; :) equals a type-speci…c exogenous weight times the individuals'level of utility. The government's desire to compensate for heterogeneous skill endowments would then require G 00 vw < 0. Let denote the marginal social cost of public funds E. For a given tax function T (:), we denote g w (respectively g 0 ) the (average and endogenous) marginal social weight associated with employed individuals of skill w (with the nonemployed), expressed in terms of public funds by:
The government values an additional dollar to the h (w) employed individuals of skill w (to the 1 H (w 1 ) nonemployed) as g w times h (w) dollars (g 0 times 1 H (w 1 ) dollars). The government thus wishes to transfer income from individuals whose social weight is below 1 to those whose social weight is above 1. As will be made clear below, g 0 and the shape of the marginal social weights w 7 ! g w entirely summarize how the government's preferences in ‡uence the optimal tax policy. The only properties we have are that g 0 and g w are positive. In particular, the shape of w 7 ! g w can be non-monotonic, decreasing or increasing and we can have g 0 above or below g w 0 . However, a government that has a redistributive motive would typically adopt a decreasing shape w 7 ! g w of social welfare weights, as discussed in Section IV.
III Optimal marginal tax rates III.1 Derivation of the optimal marginal tax formula
The government's problem consists in …nding a nonlinear income tax schedule T (:) and a welfare bene…t b to maximize the social objective (14) , subject to the budget constraint (13) and the labor supply decisions along both margins. In this section, we directly derive the optimal tax formula through small perturbations of the optimal tax function. Following Mirrlees (1971) , Appendix B solves the government's problem in terms of incentive-compatible allocations, using optimal control techniques and veri…es that both methods lead to the same optimal tax formulae.
Proposition 1
The optimal tax policy must verify
Equation (17) The mass of workers a¤ected by the substitution e¤ect isĥ (Y w ) . For these workers, according to Equation (9), the decrease by of the marginal tax rate induces a rise Y w of their earnings, with
The tax reform has only a second-order e¤ect on U w and thereby on the participation decision and its contribution to the government objective. However, the rise in earnings increases the government's tax receipt by T 0 (Y w ) Y w . Hence, given that = , the total substitution e¤ect equals:
Workers of skill n above w face a reduction in their tax level with no change in the marginal tax rate. This has three consequences.
Mechanical e¤ects First, in the absence of any behavioral response from these workers, the government gets units of tax receipts less from each of the h (n) workers of skill n. However, the tax reduction induces a higher consumption level C n , which is valued g n by the government.
Hence the total mechanical e¤ect at skill w is:
Income e¤ects Second, the tax reduction induces each of the workers of skill n to change her intensive choice by Y n = n (see Equation (10)). This income response has only a …rst-order e¤ect on the government's budget: each of the h (n) workers of skill n pays T 0 (Y n ) Y n additional tax. Hence, the total income e¤ect at skill n equals:
Participation e¤ects Finally, the reduction in tax levels induces n h (n) individuals of skill n to enter employment (see Equation (11)). The change in participation decisions then has only a …rst-order e¤ect on the government's budget. Each additional worker of skill n pays T (n)
taxes, and the government saves the welfare bene…t b. Hence, the total participation e¤ect at skill w equals:
The sum of S w , M w , I w and P w should be zero if the original tax function is optimal.
Rearranging terms then gives:
which gives (17) because of (8).
Equation (18) describes the e¤ects of providing a uniform transfer to all employed individuals. This tax perturbation does not a¤ect marginal tax rates, so it only induces the mechanical, income and participation e¤ects. The sum of (21), (22) and (23) evaluated for w = w 0 should be nil at the optimum, which leads to (18) . Equations (17) and (18) imply that the optimal marginal tax rate is nil at the minimum earnings level. 14 To grasp the intuition behind Equation (19) , consider a increase by in welfare bene…t b and a unit lump-sum decrease by in the tax function for all skill levels. This reform changes neither the marginal nor the participation tax rates. Hence, it has only mechanical and income 1 4 Intuitively, increasing the marginal tax rate at a skill level w 0 improves equity when the extra tax revenue can be redistributed towards a positive mass of people with skill levels less than or equal to w 0 . Given that the mass of agents with a skill level less than or equal to w0 is nil, a positive marginal tax rate at w0 does not improve equity. It does, however, distort the labor supply. The optimal marginal tax rate at the lowest skill level then equals zero. This result no longer holds if there is bunching at the bottom of skill distribution (Seade (1977) ). g n h (n) dn for workers.
Therefore, the mechanical e¤ect corresponds to the left-hand side of (19) . The right-hand side captures the income e¤ects along both margins. 15 First, through the income response along the intensive margin, earnings change by Y n = n . This a¤ects tax revenues by the weighted
. Second, participation decisions change through the income e¤ect by h (n) = n h (n) (See Equation (12)). Given that for each additional worker of skill n, tax revenues increase by T (Y n ) + b, the total impact is the weighted integral of
. In the normal case, n < 0 and n < 0. Therefore, as T (Y n ) + b is typically positive for most workers, we expect that larger income e¤ects along both margins increase the average of the social welfare weights (g 0 and g n 's) above 1.
III.2 Comparison with the optimal tax literature
Equation (17) There are two apparent di¤erences between our formulation of the e¢ ciency term A (w) and that in the literature. The …rst is the presence of T 00 (Y w ) in the de…nitions (7) and (9) of w and " w . This is because of our de…nitions of behavioral responses along a potentially nonlinear income tax schedule and the induced endogeneity of marginal tax rates. However, in the ratio w =" w , these additional terms cancel out. Consequently, the term A (w) is the same whether we de…ne behavioral elasticities w and " w along the optimal tax schedule (as in the present study) or along a "virtual" linear tax schedule (as common in the literature; see, e.g., Piketty (1997), Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) ). The second di¤erence is induced by our assumption on preferences (1). The literature typically imposes that preferences over consumption and inwork e¤ort do not vary with the skill level, and are described by U (C; Y =w). Then, it happens that the numerator of A (w) coincides with one plus the uncompensated elasticity of the labor supply. This is counterintuitive, as it suggests that ceteris paribus marginal tax rates increase with the latter elasticity. Our more general assumption on preferences enables us to stress that what matters is the elasticity w of earnings with respect to the skill level. Marginal tax rates are inversely related to the compensated elasticity " w , in the vein of the Ramsey's "inverse elasticity"rule.
The term B (w) captures the role of the skill distribution. Consider an increase in the marginal tax rate around the earnings level Y w (the left hand-side of Figure 2 ). The induced distortions along the intensive margin is proportional to the product of the skill level w times the number of workers at that skill level, w h(w) (Atkinson (1990) ). However, the gain in tax revenues is proportional to the number H (w 1 ) H (w) of employed individuals of skill n above w. Two di¤erences with the literature are worth noting. First, because of the extensive margin responses, what matters is the distribution of skills among employed individuals, instead of the one over the entire population. Given that h (w) =f (w) equals the employment rate of workers of skill w and (H (w 1 ) H (w)) = (1 F (w)) equals the aggregate employment rate above skill w, one can further decompose B (w) into its exogenous and endogenous components:
The …rst term on the right-hand side equals the exogenous skill distribution term of Diamond (1998). 16 Second, the distribution term in (Saez (2001) , Equation (19) 
so our optimal tax formula can also be expressed in terms of the earnings distribution, as in (24) . Both formulations have their advantage. The earnings distribution has the advantage that earnings are directly observable. However, earnings are endogenous, and hence the observed and optimal earnings distributions may di¤er. To compute optimal tax rates, one then has to specify the utility function. Once this is done, the individual's …rst-order condition (5) enables us to recover the individual's skill level w from her observed earnings Y (and from knowledge of the tax function). Accordingly, the advantage of the formulation in terms of the earnings distribution disappears. Nevertheless, we present both formulations and leave it to interested readers to choose the one they prefer.
The term C (w) captures the in ‡uence of social preferences for income redistribution, taking into account the induced responses through income e¤ects and along the participation margin.
C (w) equals the average of mechanical, income and participation e¤ects for all workers of skill n above w. Diamond (1998) considers the case where participation is exogenous and there is no income e¤ect. Introducing income e¤ects or participation responses in the analysis then amounts to modifying the social weight to:
Saez (2002, p. 1055) has explained why the government is more willing to transfer income to groups of employed individuals for which the participation response n or the participation tax T (Y n )+b is larger. The behavioral parameter n is positive, so a decrease in the level of tax paid by workers of skill n induces more of them to work. Whenever the participation tax T (Y n ) + b is positive, tax revenues increase, which is bene…cial to the social planner. A similar interpretation can be made for the income e¤ect. Typically, leisure is a normal good (hence n < 0). Then, through the income e¤ect, a decrease in the level of tax paid by workers of skill n induces them to work less through the income e¤ect. Whenever workers face a positive marginal tax rate, this response decreases the tax they pay, which is detrimental to the government. Therefore, the government is more willing to transfer income to groups of employed individuals with either lower income e¤ects (i.e. higher n ) or lower marginal tax rates (Saez (2001) ).
IV Properties of the second-best optimum IV.1 Su¢ cient condition for nonnegative marginal tax rates
We …rst consider the special case where the labor supply decisions take place only along the extensive margin, as assumed in Diamond (1980) is increasing in w, this function is increasing in the skill level. However, when workers can also decide along their intensive margin, the increasing tax function and its positive marginal tax rates induce distortions of the intensive choices. Hence, the optimal tax function depicted by the solid curve is ‡atter than the optimal curve without an intensive margin to limit the distortions along the intensive margin. It also has to be as close as possible to the optimal curve without intensive margin to limit the departures from the optimal trade-o¤ between the participation and mechanical e¤ects. 
IV.2 Examples
The su¢ cient condition in Propositions 2 and 3 depends on the patterns of social weights g w and extensive behavioral responses w , both of which are endogenous. This subsection provides examples where the primitives of the model guarantee the su¢ cient conditions in Propositions 2 and 3.
Our …rst example speci…es the primitives of the model in such a way that g w and w become exogenous. For this purpose, individuals'preferences are quasilinear: U (C; Y; w) = C V (Y; w)
The marginal utility of consumption U 0 C (C; Y; w) is then always equal to one. Moreover, we specify the distribution of the disutility of participation conditional on any skill level w as K ( ; w) = exp (a w + ), where a w is a skill-speci…c parameter adjusted to keep some individuals out-of-the labor force at the optimum. Then, according to Equation (11), w is always equal to parameter and thereby constant along the skill distribution. Finally, the social objective is linear in utility levels with skill-speci…c weights w . Given that the speci…cation of the individuals'utility rules out income e¤ects, we have g w = w = R w 1 w 0 w dw (see (15) , (16) and (19)). Therefore, under redistributive social preferences, w 7 ! w is decreasing, so (1 g w ) = w is decreasing. The marginal tax rates are then nonnegative according to Proposition 2. Note that in this example, g w 0 is necessarily strictly greater than one, so the optimal participation tax may be negative at the bottom. A negative participation tax at the bottom is nevertheless consistent with nonnegative marginal tax rates over the entire income distribution as we assume a positive lower bound for the skill distribution. Hence, the lowest earnings level is positive and the tax function can jump between Y = 0 and Y w 0 .
This …rst example is very speci…c. In general, we consider that it is plausible that w 7 ! 1 g w is nonincreasing and w 7 ! w is strictly decreasing. First, a redistributive government typically places a higher social welfare weight on the consumption of the least-skilled workers.
Second, there is some empirical evidence that the elasticity of participation, which equals We now provide more general speci…cations of the primitives where w 7 ! 1 g w is nonincreasing and w 7 ! w is strictly decreasing. Assume that the utility function is additively separable, i.e.:
The additive separability restriction is only made for technical convenience. However, showing within the pure intensive model that marginal tax rates are positive without imposing the additive separability assumption (26) was a real issue (see, e.g., Sadka 1976 , Seade 1982 , Werning 2000 . We add another restriction on preferences.
For an employed individual, the more skilled the worker, the lower the e¤ort to obtain a given earnings level. However, for the nonemployed, no e¤ort is supplied. Hence, a larger skill does not improve utility. We therefore assume:
As a result, the skill-speci…c threshold U w U (b; 0; w) of above which an individual of type (w; ) chooses not to participate is an increasing function of the skill level (See Equation (31) in Appendix B). The following properties are shown in Appendix E.
Property 1 If K ( ; w) is strictly log-concave with respect to , if w 7 ! k ( ; w) =K ( ; w) is nonincreasing in w and if (26)- (27) hold, then the function w 7 ! w is strictly decreasing.
The log-concavity of K (:; w) is a property veri…ed by many distributions commonly used. It is equivalent to assuming that k ( ; w) =K ( ; w) is decreasing in . That k ( ; w) =K ( ; w) is nonincreasing in w encompasses the benchmark case where w and are independently distributed.
Property 2 Under either Maximin or Benthamite social preferences and (26)- (27), the function w 7 ! g w is nonincreasing
Maximin (i.e., maximizing U (b; 0; w)) and Benthamite (i.e., G (U w ; w; ) U w ) social preferences are polar speci…cations. Combining Properties 1 and 2, the relation w 7 !
(1 g w ) = w can be decreasing only if g w is higher than 1. Such con…guration can only occur at the bottom end of the skill distribution and is ruled out under Maximin social preferences. If instead g w 0 1, w 7 ! (1 g w ) = w is increasing, so the su¢ cient condition for positive marginal tax rates given in Proposition 2 holds. Therefore, Propositions 2 and 3 hold under the joint following assumptions: Maximin social objective, the utility functions veri…es (26) and (27),
is strictly log-concave with respect to and k ( ; w) =K ( ; w) is nonincreasing in w.
Moreover, if the government is instead Benthamite and if g w 0 1, then Propositions 2 and 3 are again ensured.
V Numerical simulations for the U.S.
This section implements our optimal tax formula on U.S data. This exercise allows us to check whether our su¢ cient condition for nonnegative marginal tax rates is empirically reasonable.
It also highlights the quantitative impact of the extensive margin on the optimal marginal and participation tax rates.
V.1 Calibration
To calibrate the model, we need to specify social and individual preferences and the distribution of characteristics (w; ). We consider Benthamite and Maximin social preferences. We select a speci…cation of individual preferences that enables us to control behavioral responses along the intensive margin. Following Diamond (1998) and Saez (2002), we assume away income e¤ects along the intensive margin (hence w 0) and assume the compensated elasticities to be constantly equal to " along a linear tax schedule. Moreover, individuals'preferences are concave such that a Benthamite government prefers to transfer income from high-to low-income earners.
Hence, we specify:
The parameter " corresponds to the compensated elasticity of earnings with respect to one minus the marginal tax rate along a linear tax schedule (see Equation (9)), while parameter drives the redistributive preferences of a Benthamite government. Saez et alii (2010) survey the recent literature estimating the elasticity of earnings to one minus the marginal tax rate. They conclude that "the best available estimates range from 0:12 to 0:4"in the U.S. We take a central value of " = 0:25 for our benchmark. For the concavity of preferences, we take = 0:8 in the benchmark case. We conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to both of these parameters.
To calibrate the skill distribution, we employ the earnings distribution in the Current Population Survey (CPS) for May 2007. 18 We use the …rst-order condition (5) of the intensive program to infer the skill level from each observation of earnings. We consider only single individuals to avoid the complexity of interrelated labor supply decisions within families. Using the OECD tax database, the real tax schedule of singles without dependent children is well approximated by a linear tax function at rate 27:9% with an intercept of $4; 024:9 on an annual basis. We use a quadratic kernel with a bandwidth of $3; 822 to smooth h(w). High-income earners are underrepresented in the CPS. Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) argue that the skill distribution actually exhibits a fat upper tail in the U.S., which has dramatic consequences on the shape of optimal marginal tax rates. We therefore expand (in a continuously di¤erentiable way) our One needs to calibrate the conditional distribution of . Because the participation decision is dichotomous, we must specify a functional form. We choose a logistic and skill-speci…c speci…cation:
which ensures that skill-speci…c employment rates are always between 0 and 1. Parameters a w and w are calibrated to obtain empirically plausible skill-speci…c employment rates, denoted by L w , and elasticities of employment rates with respect to the di¤erence in disposable incomes These speci…cations are consistent with the empirical evidence that the employment rate L w is higher for the highly skilled. The average employment rate in the current economy equals 75:3%. The elasticity w is equal to 0:45 on average. Unreported simulations indicate that the properties of the optimal tax schedule are robust with respect to changes in the w 7 ! L w and w 7 ! w relationship.
To …x the value of b in the current economy, we consider the net replacement ratio of a long-term unemployed paid 67% of the average wage before entering unemployment. As this ratio is 9% in 2007 according to the OECD tax-bene…t calculator, 20 we set b = $2; 381. Given this calibration of the current economy, we …nd that the budget constraint (13) is veri…ed only when we set the exogenous revenue requirement to E = $6; 110 per capita. We focus on annual earnings below $100; 000. 21 Insert Figure 4 about here. Insert Figure 5 about here.
V.2 Benchmark simulations
V.3 Importance of the Extensive Margin
This section illustrates the major role played by the extensive margin. We compare how di¤erent are the optimal tax schedules with and without taking the extensive margin into account, while the distribution of skills and the number of nonemployed are exogenously kept at their calibrated levels.
Insert Figure 6 about here. Equation (17) and the C (w) term where n is set equal to zero. 22 As expected as well, the optimal marginal tax rate at the lower bound is strictly positive (and very high) under Maximin when the extensive margin is neglected. 23 Figure (6b) shows that under Benthamite preferences, the participation tax becomes positive at the bottom of the earnings distribution when the extensive margin is shut down.
V.4 Sensitivity analysis
As illustrated in Figure 7 (a), a rise in the parameter increases the aversion to inequality and this leads to a rise in marginal tax rates. Panel b shows that the optimal participation tax at the low end of the earnings distribution evolves ambiguously with . Intuitively participation taxes at the bottom are lower when the welfare weight on the least skilled workers g w 0 becomes very important. However, with a very high aversion to inequality, the welfare of the nonemployed becomes dominant and g w 0 decreases.
Insert Figure 7 about here. 
VI Conclusion
This paper explored the optimal income tax schedule when labor supply responds simultaneously along both the extensive and intensive margins. Individuals are heterogeneous across two dimensions: their skill and their disutility of participation. We derived a mild su¢ cient condition for nonnegative marginal tax rates over the entire skill distribution. This condition is derived using a new method to sign distortions (along the intensive margin) in screening models with random participation. Our exercise illustrated that at the optimum, negative participation tax rates can coexist with positive marginal tax rates everywhere.
Using U.S. data, we implemented our optimal tax formula. This exercise emphasized that the optimal tax schedule is U-shaped as in the literature without an extensive margin. However, introducing the extensive margin quite substantially reduces the marginal tax rates. Interestingly, the marginal tax rates are always positive in our simulations.
The work undertaken in this study identi…es several possible extensions. Among them, the method to sign distortion along the intensive margin can be applied to other contexts of monopoly screening with random participation à la Rochet and Stole (2002) . Moreover, we ignored the interactions in labor supply decisions within couples (Kreiner et alii (2009)). Finally, it would be interesting to extend the numerical simulations to countries other than the U.S.
Appendices
A Behavioral elasticities
We de…ne:
The …rst-order condition (5) is equivalent to Y (Y w ; w; 0; 0) = 0. When T (:) is twice-di¤erentiable, one has (using (5)):
The second-order condition is Y 0 Y (Y w ; w; 0; 0) 0, which gives (6) . When this condition holds with strict inequality, and when the global maximum in Y of U (Y T (Y ) ; Y; w) is unique, we can apply the implicit function theorem to Y (Y w ; w; 0; 0). Provided that the sizes of the changes in w, and are small enough for the maximum of Y 7 ! U (Y T (Y ) ; Y; w) to change only marginally, one has for x = w; ; , that @Y =@x = Y 0 x =Y 0 Y evaluated at (Y w ; w; 0; 0). This leads directly to (7), (9) and (10) .
We now make the link between our de…nitions of behavioral elasticities and the elasticities along a linear tax schedule used in Saez (2001) . We denote the latter with a tilde. Rewriting (9), (10) and (7) with T 00 (:) = 0 yields:
Consider now a uniform decrease of marginal tax rates (respectively a rise of the level of tax, a rise w in skill). Such a "reform" has a …rst impact on earnings 1 Y w that equals:
which in turn implies a change in marginal tax rates of T 00 (Y w ) 1 Y w . Hence, the reform has a second impact on earnings that equals:
This "circular process"takes place in…nitely, with the n th impact on earnings being linked to the (n 1) th impact through:
Using the identity 1 x + x 2 x 3 ::: = 1= (1 + x), the total impact equals
T 00 (Y w ) . Hence " w , w , w ," w ,~ w and~ w are linked through
Using (5) and (29) , one retrieves (9), (10) and (7).
B The government' s optimum
This appendix solves the government's problem in terms of allocation, as in Mirrlees (1971) , and considers the possibility of bunching. Using the obtained government's optimality conditions, we show the equivalence between this formulation and the optimal tax formula of Proposition 1.
According to the taxation principle (Hammond 1979 , Rochet 1985 and Guesnerie 1995 , the set of allocations induced by the tax function T (:) corresponds to the set of incentive-compatible allocations fY w ; C w ; U w g w2[w 0 ;w 1 ] that verify:
The incentive-compatible restrictions (30) impose the condition that when taking their intensive decisions, workers of skill w prefer the bundle (C w ; Y w ) designed for them rather then the bundle (C x ; Y x ) designed for workers of any other skill level x. We assume that w 7 ! Y w is continuous on [w 0 ; w 1 ] and di¤erentiable everywhere, except for a …nite number of skill levels. Finally, w 7 ! U w is di¤erentiable. Hence, w 7 ! C w is also continuous everywhere and di¤erentiable almost everywhere. These assumptions are made for reasons of tractability and have been standard since Guesnerie and La¤ont (1984) . 24 From Equation (2), the strict single-crossing condition holds. Hence, constraints (30) are equivalent to imposing the di¤erential equation:
and the monotonicity requirement that the earnings level Y w be a nondecreasing function of the skill level w. We obtain:
The necessary conditions for the government's problem are: 25 if there is no bunching at skill w :
if there is bunching over [w; w] :
For all skill levels:
with Z w 1 = Z w 0 = 0 and:
Proof. Given that U (:; :; :) is increasing in C, we de…ne C w as function (U w ; Y w ; w) such that U = U (C; Y; w) if and only if C = (U; Y; w). We obtain where the functions are evaluated at (w; C w ; U w ; Y w ). We consider Y w as the control variable and U w as the state variable. Then equals the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (13) . Let q w be the costate variable associated to (31) Using Z w = q w = , (36) and (37) leads to (32) .
If there is bunching over [w; w], one must have R w w @H=@Y (Y w ; U w ; q w ; w; ) dw = 0. Using again Z w = q w = (36) and (37) gives (33) .
The transversality conditions are q w 0 = q w 1 = 0 and, for any skill level where w 7 ! Y w is continuous, one obtains _ q w = @H=@U (Y w ; U w ; q w ; w; ). Using Z w = q w = and (15) gives (34) .
Finally, the …rst-order condition with respect to b gives (35) .
We now show how to retrieve the formula in Proposition 1. Let: 
At skill levels for where there is no bunching, Equation (32) can be rewritten using (5), (28b) and (28c) as:
Using (7), (9) (28b) and (28c) we obtain:
h (w) = J w w " w w
E Proofs of Properties 1 and 2
Under (27), U w is increasing in skill w. Then, a Maximin government values only the welfare of the nonemployed and g w = 0 for all skill levels, which ensures property 2 for a Maximin government. Under (26) , U 0 C depends only on the consumption level. From (2), incentive-compatible conditions (30) imply that w 7 ! C w is nondecreasing. Therefore, as u 00 CC < 0, w 7 ! U 0 C (C w ; Y w ; w) is nondecreasing, and increasing without bunching.
Under (26) and a Benthamite government, g w simply equals U 0 C (C w ; Y w ; w) = according to (15) , which ensures property 2 for a Benthamite government.
Under Assumption (27) , one has that the threshold value U w U (b; 0; w) of below which individuals of type (w; ) choose to work, is decreasing in skill level w. So, when K ( ; w) is strictly log-concave with respect to and w 7 ! k ( ; w) =K ( ; w) is nonincreasing in w, then w 7 ! k (U w U (b; 0; w) ; w) =K (U w U (b; 0; w) ; w) is decreasing. Together with w 7 ! U 0 C (C w ; Y w ; w) being nondecreasing, using (11) ensures that w 7 ! w is decreasing, even in the presence of bunching. Consequently, Property 1 is ensured.
E.1 Example 1
A Maximin government values only the welfare of the nonemployed, so g w = 0 for all skill levels and (1 g w ) = w = 1= w . As Property 1 holds, (1 g w ) = w is therefore increasing in w and Proposition 2 applies. Moreover, as g w = 0, Proposition 3 also applies.
E.2 Example 2
Combining Properties 1, 2 and g w 1 ensures that (1 g w ) = w is increasing in w. As a result, Proposition 2 applies, and thereby Proposition 3 as it has been assumed that g w 1. 
